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Florida Absentee Voter Fraud: Fashioning an
Appropriate Judicial Remedy
The most abject traitor to democratic institutions is the one who buys
or intimidates the electorate for personal gain and next to him is the
voter who habitually goes into the open market and pawns his vote to
anyone who will purchase it. They are the termites and screw worms
of democracy and if not exterminated, they will as surely wreck the
ship of state as the latter will destroy the house or the dumb creature
on which they feed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the 1997 Miami mayoral election was a sleazy
affair. Absentee ballots were doctored, unsigned, or signed by people
who did not live in the city. Other ballots were witnessed by a person
not known to the voter. Still others were submitted by voters who did
not live at the address given on the ballot request. One vote even came
from a man who had been dead for years. A Miami-Dade County trial
court called sixty witnesses, and nearly half of them exercised their right
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution to remain
silent.2 The whole mess led one federal judge reviewing the case to
characterize the election and ensuing trials as creating an "almost circus
atmosphere."3
Notwithstanding the chaos associated with this election, this Com-
ment analyzes several serious issues arising from the two divergent judi-
cial remedies applied to this case of election fraud: the trial court's
remedy of ordering a new election and the appellate court's remedy,
which reversed the trial court's decision and invalidated all absentee bal-
lots, declaring the winner based solely on the machine vote.
Part II of this Comment briefly reviews this case's judicial journey.
It begins with the trial court's decision ordering a new election and con-
cludes with the Supreme Court of Florida's refusal to grant review of the
appellate court's invalidation of all absentee ballots, including the chal-
lenger's failed attempt to involve the federal courts. Part III places the
statutory right of absentee voting in Florida into perspective by discuss-
1. State ex rel. Whitley v. Rinehart, 140 Fla. 645, 651 (1939).
2. See In re Matter of Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4, 1997,
Elections for the City of Miami, Dade County, Fla., No. 97-25596 CA 09, at 1 (Fla. Dade County
Ct. Mar. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 091.
3. Scheer v. City of Miami, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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ing its constitutional connections and statutory framework. Parts IV and
V examine the two principal remedies applied in this case: invalidation
of tainted ballots and new election. Part VI then looks more critically at
the decisions rendered by the trial and appellate courts and illustrates a
dilemma requiring much more flexibility than the controlling precedent
has allowed. Part VII offers a proposal that responds to the dilemma by
providing courts with a more flexible approach to absentee voter fraud
cases. Finally, Part VIII suggests the appellate court's decision in this
case, notwithstanding its tortured reasoning, may have responded prop-
erly to the circumstances. Yet, given some plausible factual changes
and this Comment's more flexible approach, the court could have just as
reasonably affirmed the trial court's order for a new election.
II. 1997 MIAMI MAYORAL ELECTION: JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
ABSENTEE VOTER FRAUD
On November 4, 1997, the voters of the City of Miami went to the
polls to elect an "executive mayor."4 The two principal contenders for
this strengthened mayoral position were Joe Carollo, who the voters had
elected as the Mayor of the City of Miami the preceding July, and Xav-
ier Suarez, who previously served as the City's Mayor and now sought
the newly enhanced mayoral position. When all the ballots were
counted, Carollo received a slim majority of the machine-counted, pre-
cinct votes (51.41%), while Suarez received a significantly higher per-
centage (61.48%) of the absentee votes.' However, neither candidate
received a majority of the total votes cast, and the city held a run-off
election on November 13, 1997.6 In the run-off, Suarez won a majority
of both the machine votes and the absentee votes, and he assumed the
position of Mayor shortly thereafter.
7
Immediately after the City announced the results of the November
4 election, Carollo challenged the absentee votes. Investigators working
for him began to examine the absentee ballots for possible fraud on the
part of the Suarez campaign. Within a week, the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement arrested two Suarez supporters for buying absentee
votes and fraudulently witnessing absentee ballots.8 The day after losing
the run-off election, Carollo petitioned the Circuit Court for the Eleventh
4. See David Lyons & Maria A. Morales, Carollo Back as Miami Mayor; Suarez Says He'll
Keep on Fighting, MiAMi HERALD, March 12, 1998, at 14A.
5. See In re The Matter of Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4,
1997 Election for the City of Miami, Fla., 707 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), cert.
denied, 725 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1998) [hereinafter Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170].
6. See id. at 1172.
7. See id.
8. See Chronology, MiAMi HERALD, March 12, 1998, at 14A.
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Judicial Circuit of Florida ("trial court"), seeking to overturn the
November 4 election on the grounds of absentee ballot fraud.9
A. Trial Court
On February 9, 1998, the state trial court began to hear arguments
and testimony. In the ensuing two and one-half weeks, the court heard
testimony from sixty witnesses, read depositions from twenty-seven
more, and examined 195 exhibits. 10 The court considered layperson as
well as expert testimony. Testimony included experts in handwriting,
research methodology and statistical analysis.'1 In the process, the court
honored the request of twenty-seven witnesses to remain silent as guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.' 2 The
trial court entered its final judgment on March 3, 1998.13
Finding evidence of massive fraud, the trial court voided the
November 4 mayoral election and ordered a new election within sixty
days.' 4 In its final judgment, the court stated:
Viewed in its entirety, the evidence shows a pattern of fraudulent,
intentional and criminal conduct that resulted in such an extensive
abuse of the absentee ballot laws that it can fairly be said that the
intent of these laws was totally frustrated. . . . [T]his scheme to
defraud, literally and figuratively, stole the ballot from the hands of
every honest voter in the City of Miami.15
The court concluded that "the integrity of the election was
adversely affected,"1 6 but there was no indication that "Mr. Suarez knew
about or participated in this fraud."' 7 The trial court ordered a new elec-
tion as "the only appropriate remedy under the circumstances of this
case."'" Subsequently, Joe Carollo appealed the trial court's decision to
the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida ("appellate court"), arguing
that the trial court's remedy was inappropriate.' 9
9. See Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 09, supra note 2.
10. See id. at 1.
11. See id. at 2-3.
12. See id. at 1.
13. See id. at 4.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 3-4.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170, supra note 5. Although Suarez filed a cross-
appeal, he failed to file an initial brief as required by the court, and therefore the court dismissed
his cross-appeal. See id. at 1175.
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B. Appellate Court
The appellate court affirmed the part of the trial court's opinion
relating to the finding of fraud, stating that "substantial competent evi-
dence existed to support the trial court's findings of massive fraud in the
absentee ballots. '2° However, it did not agree with the trial court's rem-
edy in ordering a new election. The appellate court explained, "[O]ur
consideration of the relevant case law and strong public policy consider-
ations lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the only appropriate
remedy for this absentee voter fraud is the invalidation of all absentee
ballots."'21 The court reversed the trial court's order, which voided the
entire election, and remanded the case with directions to enter a final
judgment that "voids and vacates the absentee ballots only and ... pro-
vides that the outcome of the November 4, 1997, City of Miami Mayoral
election shall be determined solely upon the machine ballots cast at the
polls, resulting in the election of Joe Carollo as Mayor of the City of
Miami. 22
Ignominiously turned out of office after having served only four
months, Xavier Suarez unsuccessfully sought relief from both the Flor-
ida Supreme Court and the federal district court.23
C. Federal District Court
Absentee voters and supporters of Suarez who were disen-
franchised with the appellate court's opinion invalidating all absentee
ballots petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida for a new election.24 The federal court, however, had
little desire to ignore the abstention doctrine and become involved in
what it surely saw as an unseemly affair.25
Concluding as a matter of law that the irregularities in this election
were episodic rather than endemic, the federal court was unwilling to
overturn a state election.26 In particular, the court said that "Florida
courts for the past sixty years have constructed a means of dealing with
absentee voter fraud"27 and that it should not "upset this remedy as it has
been well thought out by the state courts. '28
20. Id. at 1171.
21. Id. at 1174.
22. Id. at 1175.
23. See generally Scheer v. City of Miami, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Fla. 1998); see also
Arnold Markowitz, Court Rejects Suarez's Latest Appeal, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 29, 1998, at 2B.
24. See Scheer, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
25. See id. at 1341.
26. See id. at 1342.
27. Id. at 1344.
28. Id. As argued in this Comment, it is misleading to assert, as did the federal district court,
[Vol. 54:625
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As a matter of equity, the federal district court was less circumspect
and decidedly more emotional than the appellate court. The court stated
that, even if Mr. Suarez could establish a constitutional violation, it
would "stay on the sideline of this state dispute" 29 because of "such
countervailing equitable factors as the extremely disruptive effect of
election invalidation and the havoc it wreaks upon [the] local political
community."30 The court continued, "The City of Miami has been
scarred by the events that took place during and after the 1997 Mayoral
election. The City and its citizens are finally starting to heal. Equity
necessitates that the Court not re-open these wounds."'3 1 Accordingly,
the district court denied the Suarez supporters' petition. 2
D. State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Florida declined to review the decision of
the appellate court, ending the judicial journey of this election battle.3 3
Following this decision, the Miami Herald quoted Mr. Suarez as saying,
"I don't know of any other judicial remedy that can be sought."34 The
appellate court's decision stands today.35
Before examining in detail the appellate court's decision and the
alternative remedy proposed by the trial court, this Comment discusses
the privilege of voting by absentee ballot.
III. THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CAST AN ABSENTEE VOTE
It is axiomatic that all citizens have the right to vote. 36  As the
that Florida's invalidation remedy is a long-standing, well-thought-out means of dealing with
absentee fraud. As discussed in Part VI, the invalidation remedy has been applied only recently to
absentee fraud cases. Likewise, as suggested in Part VII, it is arguably limited in application.
29. Id. at 1345.
30. Id. at 1344 (quoting Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176,
1180 (9th Cir. 1988)).
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1345.
33. See In re The Matter of Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4,
1997 Election for the City of Miami, Fla., 725 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1998); see also Markowitz, supra
note 23, at 9B.
34. See Markowitz, supra note 23, at B2.
35. Florida maintains a two-tier appellate court system that includes the district courts of
appeal, which are in most cases the appellate court of last resort, and the Supreme Court of
Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida exercises only discretionary jurisdiction in the majority of
non-criminal appeals. Florida intermediate appellate court decisions, therefore, are generally
binding precedent throughout the state. See Karlin v. City of Miami Beach, 113 So. 2d 551, 552
(Fla. 1959); see generally Gerald B. Cope, Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate
Appellate Courts: A Comparison of Florida's System with Those of the Other States and the
Federal System, 45 FLA. L. REV. 21 (1993) (describing Florida's two-tier appellate court system
and the criteria for the Supreme Court of Florida's discretionary review).
36. See generally Roe v. Alabama, 676 So. 2d 1206 (Ala. 1995) (discussing the right to vote
2000]
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United States Supreme Court has said, "No right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who
make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."37
Despite this statement, the right to vote is not absolute. Voters
must meet certain legal qualifications before casting their ballots. 38 Pro-
vided a citizen is legally qualified to vote, the Supreme Court has held
that "the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection ... as
the right to put a ballot in the box.39 There is, however, no federal or
state constitutional right to vote by absentee ballot. Instead, states statu-
torily provide their residents with the right of voting by mail.40
Absentee voting first appeared during the Civil War, when several
states passed laws allowing soldiers far from the polls to vote.4 Follow-
ing the war, many of the states repealed their absentee voting laws.4 2
Beginning in 1896, with the passage of an absentee voting law in Ver-
mont, states began passing new absentee voting laws. These laws
expanded the privilege to non-military members of the community who
were away from their voting precinct. More recently, the privilege has
included citizens who, though present in their voting district, are unable
or, perhaps, unwilling to go to the polls.
4 3
Today, all states provide for some form of absentee voting. Thirty-
five states and the District of Columbia allow absentee voting in all elec-
tions, while the other fifteen states authorize absentee voting in most
generally as background for an answer to a federal district court's certified question concerning
the state's absentee voting laws).
37. Id. at 1220 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)).
38. The United States Constitution expressly grants to the states the authority to establish
qualifications to vote. See U.S. CoNsT. Art. I § 2, cl. 1, § 4, cl. 1. This grant of authority,
however, was made subject to congressional review. See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 4, cl. 1.
Additionally, several amendments to the Constitution have restricted the manner in which the
states may qualify the right to vote. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIV, § 2, XV, § 2, XVII, § 1, XIX,
§ 1, XXIV, § 1, and XXVI, § 1.
39. Griffin v. Bums, 570 F.2d 1065, 1074 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Mosley,
238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915)).
40. See generally Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Voting by Mail, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 1261, n.6
(1985) (presenting a comprehensive discussion of California's absentee voting statutes and a
proposal to improve those laws).
41. See id. at 1261.
42. See id. at 1264 (mentioning California's repeal of its Civil War absentee voting statute);
see also Thompson v. Scheier, 57 P.2d 293, 296 (N.M. 1936) (stating that the New Mexico
legislature probably repealed its absentee voting law in 1889); Jenkins v. State Bd. of Elections,
104 S.E. 346, 348 (N.C. 1920) (discussing the early history of North Carolina's absentee ballot
statute).
43. See Moreton, supra note 40, at 1261-62.
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elections.' Although four states permit all registered voters to vote by
absentee ballot in any election, the majority restrict absentee voting to
those voters who meet specific criteria, usually specified in the state
statutes implementing absentee voting.45
Florida first enacted its absentee voting law in 1917.46 This law
allowed voters to cast their ballots outside their county, but it required
that they vote in person at some recognized voting precinct within the
state.47 The obvious limitations of this law led to a 1927 amendment
that authorized voters who would be outside their county on election
day, or who were unable to go to the polling place, to cast their ballots in
advance, either by hand-delivering or mailing them to an appropriate
election official.48 Over the next seventy years, the legislature periodi-
cally amended this law, expanding the class of voters allowed to vote in
this manner, while at the same time looking for ways to ensure the integ-
rity of the absentee voting process.4 9
From the beginning, ambivalence about this method of enfranchise-
ment was evident. On the one hand, officials believed that it served a
useful purpose because it permitted a greater number of people to vote.50
Supporters hoped that this method of enfranchisement would encourage
higher voter participation, which in turn would lend added legitimacy to
elected government.5  Because of this belief, Florida courts, like courts
in other jurisdictions, have largely supported the validity of the statutory
right to vote by absentee ballot. 2
44. See id. at 1262-63.
45. See id. at 1263.
46. See FLA. STAT. ch. 7380 (1917).
47. See id. § 2.
48. See FLA. STAT. ch. 11824 (1927).
49. The Florida legislature has frequently modified the absentee voter statutes. After 1927,
the next significant change occurred in 1949, when the law was amended to allow (1) those who
were physically disabled and unable without assistance of another to attend the polls on election
day and (2) those who expect to be absent from the county during the entire period polls are open
because of compelling business reasons and who cannot without manifest inconvenience vote in
person. See FLA. STAT. ch. 25385 § 1 (1949); FLA. STAT. §101.02 (1949). In 1959, the legislature
allowed citizens who were unable to attend the polls because of the tenets of their religion to vote
by absentee ballot. See FLA. STAT. ch. 59213 § 2 (1959). In 1965, the legislature added those
volunteering to work at the polls to the list of persons allowed to vote by absentee ballot. See FLA.
STAT. ch. 65380 § 32 (1965). Finally, in 1975 the legislature removed the requirement to have the
absentee ballot notarized. See FLA. STAT. ch. 75174 § 2 (1975).
50. See Moreton, supra note 40, at 1265-66; see also Jolley v. Whatley, 60 So. 2d 762, 764
(Fla. 1952).
51. See Moreton, supra note 40, at 1265-66.
52. The constitutionality of Florida's absentee voting laws was first tested in 1932. In that
year, in State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker, 143 So. 754, 756 (Fla. 1932), the Supreme Court of
Florida joined a growing number of other states that had reviewed and held their absentee voting
statute valid. A few years later, however, in State ex rel. Whitley v. Rinehart, 192 So. 819, 823
(1939), the Supreme Court of Florida held that parts of the absentee voting statutes enacted in
20001
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On the other hand, this statutory right has always concerned those
interested in maintaining honest elections.53 As one federal judge
lamented about voter fraud in the early 1990s, "nothing undermines
democratic government more quickly than fraudulent elections."54 The
widely held view is that absentee voting is much more susceptible to
illegal activity than voting in person at the polling place. Nearly
twenty years ago, Florida's First District Court of Appeal stated, "The
challenge to an elector at the polls involves a face-to-face confrontation
between the elector and the election officials. Obviously, no such
opportunity is available with absentee voters."56
Thus, while the Florida legislature has consistently expanded the
statutory right to vote by absentee ballot over the years, Florida courts
have steadfastly limited the right of absentee voters to have their vote
counted as compared to those who cast their ballots in person.57 For the
1935 were invalid because those provisions allowed electors outside Florida to cast absentee
ballots without proper assurance that they were qualified to vote in Florida. Since Whitley, the
Supreme Court of Florida has supported the validity of the absentee voting statutes.
53. See, e.g., Whitley, 192 So. at 823; Frink v. State ex rel. Turk, 35 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1948);
Parra v. Harvey, 89 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla. 1956); Spradley v. Bailey, 292 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1974); Anderson v. Canvassing Bd., 399 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
54. Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 318 (3d Cir. 1994).
55. See, e.g., Whitley, 192 So. at 819. In this early case, Judge Terrell alluded to the
vulnerability of absentee voting to corruption when he stated that the "purity of the ballot is more
difficult to preserve when voting absent than when voting in person." Id. at 823. See also
Moreton, supra note 40, at 1261.
56. Anderson, 399 So. 2d at 1023. For a further discussion of the issue of maintaining honest
elections while at the same time seeking to minimize, if not altogether avoid, the
disenfranchisement of absentee voters, see Part VI, below.
57. The right of absentee voters to have their legally cast votes counted has, of course, been
litigated in the federal courts. Voters seeking a federal court remedy must first overcome the
abstention doctrine hurdle, which in effect serves to restrict federal court involvement in strictly
state matters. In Matter of Protest, for example, the federal district court refused to become
involved in the Miami election. See discussion supra Part II.C. Arguably, the most influential
decision where absentee voters succeeded in overcoming the abstention doctrine and in
establishing the right to have their legally cast ballots counted is Griffin, decided in 1978. See
Griffin v. Bums, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). There, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
invalidated all absentee votes cast in a primary election not because of any wrongdoing but
because absentee voting was not expressly provided for in the controlling state statute. See id. at
1068. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state supreme court's invalidation of
absentee votes violated the voters' due process and warranted a federal remedy. See id. at 1078-
79. The court, therefore, ordered a new election. See id. at 1080. Several years later, in Marks v.
Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994), a case where there was wrongdoing, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit upheld a federal district court's decision that several absentee voters, among
others, had a federal claim where the winning candidate, William Stinson, was party to substantial
absentee ballot fraud that led to his victory. See id. at 885. The Third Circuit, however, followed
neither Griffin, ordering a new election, nor the district court's remedy, invalidating all the
absentee ballots and declaring Marks, who won a plurality of the machine vote, the winner. See
id. at 887. The invalidation remedy would have had the effect of disenfranchising absentee voters
who had cast their votes legally. See id. Instead, it authorized the district court to determine, if it
could, whether, but for the wrongdoing of Stinson and his supporters, Marks would have won the
[Vol. 54:625
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most part, early violations of the absentee voting laws involved failures
to comply with what may be categorized as the technical requirements
of the statutes.58 In these instances, the courts initially took the view
that voters, candidates, and election officials must strictly comply with
the statutes for an absentee vote to be valid.59 Beginning in 1975, in
Boardman v. Esteva,6 the Supreme Court of Florida joined a growing
number of states in adopting the position that, notwithstanding technical
irregularities in the absentee ballot, a vote could stand so long as it sub-
stantially complied with the absentee voting statutes.61
At the same time, neither Florida nor any other state has tolerated
fraud. As the Florida Supreme Court put it several years ago, "Courts
cannot ignore fraudulent conduct [that] is purposefully done to foul or
corrupt a ballot. '62 Therefore, where a party alleges and a Florida court
finds evidence of a fraudulently cast ballot affecting the election's out-
come, courts do not allow the results of the election to stand.63
Given the uncontroverted finding of absentee voter fraud in the
Miami mayoral election, the issue becomes one of fashioning an appro-
election outright. See id. at 889. If the district court could make that determination, in effect
filtering out the illegal absentee votes, it was authorized to declare Marks the winner. See id. If
not, it was authorized to order a new election. See id. On remand, the district court determined
that, but for the fraudulent acts of Stinson and his supporters, Marks would have won the election;
it therefore declared him the winner and avoided a new election. See Michelle L. Robertson,
Election Fraud - Winning at All Costs: Election Fraud in the Third Circuit, 40 VILL. L. REv. 869,
919 (1995). On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed this decision. See id. Thus, in the federal
courts, there is a discernible pattern of avoiding, if at all possible, the disenfranchisement of
absentee voters who cast their ballots legally.
58. See, e.g., Frink v. State ex rel. Turk, 35 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1948) (reviewing the validity of
affidavits that said the elector would be absent from his or her city instead of the county, as
prescribed by the state statute); Jolley v. Whatley, 60 So. 2d 762, 767 (Fla. 1952) (ruling on
whether requests for absentee ballots need to be in writing or to specifically contain a statutory
reason for requesting the ballot); Griffin v. Knoth, 67 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1953) (reviewing
validity of absentee ballots that contained statements that the voter would be away from a
municipality instead of the county); Wood v. Diefenbach, 81 So. 2d 777, 777 (Fla. 1955) (ruling
on absentee ballot applications that were made out incorrectly or not at all); Parra v. Harvey, 89
So. 2d 870, 871-72 (Fla. 1956) (reviewing absentee ballots not returned in person or by mail,
ballots cast by electors who stated they would be absent from a city and not the county, and ballots
not filled out properly).
59. See, e.g., Frink, 35 So. 2d at 12 (holding that "[tihe statute ...must have a strict
interpretation"); Parra, 89 So. 2d at 872 (concluding that "the statute with reference to absentee
voting must be strictly applied").
60. 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
61. See id. at 264; see generally Roe, 676 So. 2d at 1226 (providing a state-by-state survey of
states that have adopted the substantial compliance doctrine (App. A) and those that have retained
a form of the strict compliance doctrine (App. B)).
62. Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1984) (citing Wilson v. Revels, 61 So. 2d 491,
492 (Fla. 1952)).
63. See id.; Juri v. Canvassing Bd., No. 93-21848 (04) and No. 94-04341 (04) 1, 6 (Fla. Dade
County Ct. Nov. 7, 1994).
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priate remedy that best balances what are at times opposing interests:
enfranchising absentee voters and deterring future fraudulent conduct.
IV. THE APPELLATE CouRT's REMEDY: INVALIDATE ALL
ABSENTEE BALLOTS
A. Historical Perspective
Had the appellate court wanted to punish Suarez for the fraudulent
conduct of his supporters, it certainly had the weight of Florida prece-
dent behind it. Beginning in 1939 with State ex rel. Whitley v. Rine-
hart6 4 and continuing with subsequent cases, Florida courts have
invalidated absentee votes in a variety of situations. For the most part,
however, they have applied this remedy to cases involving technical
deficiencies and not fraud.
1. INVALIDATION IN RESPONSE TO TECHNICAL DEFICIENCIES IN
ABSENTEE BALLOTS
In Whitley, the winning candidate for a four-year city commission
position had only one more vote than his opponent.65 Of the 206 absen-
tee ballots cast, the Supreme Court of Florida found a substantial
number submitted under an ambiguous provision in the state absentee
voting law.66 The court, concerned that this ambiguity might make it
possible to corrupt rather than preserve the "purity of the ballot,"67
remanded the case to the trial judge with specific instructions. If the
lower court determined that any of the absentee ballots had been cast
under that ambiguous provision of the law, it was to order the election
held "illegal as to the absentee votes and order the appropriate City offi-
cials to declare the result [of the election] on the basis of the machine
vote [only]. ' '68
In the 1950's, the Supreme Court of Florida applied this remedy
several times. Griffin v. Knoth69 involved a 1953 general municipal
election. There, the court concluded that twenty-seven absentee votes in
this election were invalid because they did not technically comply with
the absentee voting statute. 70 The court held that "none of the absentee
ballots cast in the election ... can be accepted and counted. The elec-
64. 140 Fla. 645 (1939).
65. See id. at 646.
66. See id. at 654-55.
67. Id. at 655.
68. Id.
69. 67 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1953).
70. See id. at 432.
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tion must be determined upon the machine vote."'71
In a factually similar case just two years later, Wood v. Diefen-
bach,72 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a disputed election for
the Mayor of the City of North Miami Beach. The trial judge had ruled
"that a sufficient number of absentee ballots . . .were illegal and null
and void in that the applications for such absentee ballots either were not
made at all or were not executed in the manner required by law. '73 The
Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this ruling, as well as the trial court's
order decreeing the party with the most machine votes as the winner.74
The following year, in Parra v. Harvey,7" the Supreme Court of
Florida took up the appeal of a candidate for city commissioner who
registered more total votes but far fewer absentee votes than did his
opponent.76 The trial judge determined that more than 250 absentee bal-
lots were defective because of technicalities. These deficiencies
included the fact that over half of the absentee voters "swore they
expected to be absent from the city instead of the county as the law
provides.77 Consequently, the trial court rejected all absentee ballots.78
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this ruling, concluding that,
"[s]ince the illegal absentee ballots were sufficient in number to alter the
result, the election should be determined by the votes registered on the
machines. ' 79
In the 1970s, Florida courts applied this rule again. In 1974, the
First District Court of Appeal reviewed the results of a primary election
for county sheriff.8 0 One candidate won thirty-six more machine votes
than did his opponent but, after including the absentee ballots, his oppo-
nent had fifty more total votes.8" The trial court found that 456 absentee
ballots were cast illegally and therefore were invalid.8 2 Although it was
not convinced that 456 ballots were invalid, the appellate court nonethe-
less concluded that at least fifty-one were, an amount sufficient to trig-
ger the invalidation remedy. 3 Although most of these irregularities
were the result of technical violations to the absentee voting statute,
84
71. Id.
72. 81 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955).
73. Id. at 777.
74. See id. at 777-78.
75. 89 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1956).
76. Id. at 871.
77. Id. at 872.
78. See id. at 874.
79. Id.
80. See Spradley v. Bailey, 292 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 28-29.
84. See id. at 28.
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one group of fifty ballots was more troublesome. One campaign worker
contacted fifty different voters regarding voting by absentee ballot and
delivered their ballots to the election officials herself, in violation of the
voting statute.85 The court's opinion, though, was devoid of any explicit
reference to fraud.
In all of these cases, the Florida courts affirmed decisions overturn-
ing elections by invalidating absentee votes primarily because the ballots
did not comply with the specific, technical provisions of the absentee
voting statutes.
The issue of technical violations to the absentee voting law was
again raised, and a resolution of sorts reached, in the seminal Boardman
v. Esteva8 6 decision. The case involved an election for a seat on the
Second District Court of Appeal during which Mr. Boardman received
249 more votes overall than did his opponent Mr. Esteva. 87 Esteva had
404 more machine votes than did Boardman; Boardman 653 more
absentee votes. 8 After reviewing the long line of cases adopting a strict
construction of the absentee voting statutes, the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that "we now recede from that rule and hereby reaffirm the
rule... that substantial compliance with the absentee voting laws is all
that is required to give legality to the ballot."8 9
In the immediate wake of Boardman, five absentee voter cases
reached the district court level.90 In two instances, the appellate courts
concluded that technical irregularities in the conduct of the voting were
not in substantial compliance with the absentee voting laws, and they
affirmed judgments declaring the winner of the elections solely on the
basis of the machine votes. 91 In two others, the appellate courts con-
cluded either that the irregularities complained of were in substantial
compliance with the absentee voting laws92 or that the number of irregu-
larities failing to substantially comply with those laws was insufficient
to effect a change in the election.93 As a result, these courts affirmed the
judgments sustaining the election results. In the fifth, the appellate court
85. See id. at 28-29.
86. 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
87. See id. at 261.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 264.
90. See Peacock v. Wise, 351 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Anderson v. Canvassing &
Election Bd. of Gadsen County, Fla., 399 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Potter v. Bolden, 416
So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Wakulla County v. Flack, 419 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982);
and McLean v. Bellamy, 437 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
91. See Peacock, 351 So. 2d at 1135; see also Flack, 419 So. 2d at 1127.
92. See McLean, 437 So. 2d at 750.
93. See Anderson, 399 So. 2d at 1022-23.
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addressed the issue of substantial absentee voter fraud.94
2. INVALIDATION REMEDY IN RESPONSE TO FRAUDULENT
ABSENTEE VOTING
Since the state first adopted an absentee voting law in 1917, Florida
appellate courts have infrequently reviewed cases involving absentee
voting fraud. One of the first cases where fraud was an explicit, though
not dispositive, consideration was McDonald v. Miller,9 decided in
1956. In that case, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected a request to
invalidate absentee votes and declare a winner based solely on the
machine vote.96
McDonald involved a primary election to determine the Democratic
candidate for county sheriff.97 McDonald received twenty-eight more
machine votes than Miller, but, after counting the absentee votes, Miller
had seven more votes overall than McDonald.9" Recognizing that seven
was the magic number, McDonald contended that at least seventy-four
absentee votes were illegal and sought the invalidation of all 271 absen-
tee votes.99 Although having no difficulty rejecting three votes cast by
non-residents of the county,"° the Florida Supreme Court was nonethe-
less unable to find at least four more "illegal" absentee votes to trigger
the invalidation remedy, which would have allowed McDonald to win
the election. The court found three ballots were valid because they were
delivered to a duly-appointed election official.'' The court determined
that of the remaining seventy-one challenged absentee ballots, four were
not applied for or delivered to the supervisor of registration as required
by law, thirty-two were evidently marked in the presence of three differ-
ent third parties, and another thirty-two involved applications that were
allegedly received after the submission deadline. °2 Under the strict
compliance rule then in existence, the court could easily have invali-
dated these votes. The court, however, concluded that they were valid.
Why?
The election smelled. The appellate record showed that the trial
judge heard testimony "that votes were bartered and sold." 103 The judge
94. See Potter, 416 So. 2d at 6.
95. 90 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1956).
96. See id. at 129.
97. See id. at 126.
98. See id.
99. See id. The challenged votes were those discussed in paragraphs (a) through (f), which,
when added together equal seventy-four.
100. See id. at 127.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 127-28.
103. Id. at 127.
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concluded that "there is certainly strong evidence to suggest that in
numerous instances workers for the candidates completely ignored the
constitutional provisions preserving secrecy of the ballot."1 " Many of
these workers found it necessary to assert their Fifth Amendment
rights. 10 5 Even more problematic, McDonald, the incumbent sheriff and
a candidate in this election, seemingly witnessed all or a part of this
misconduct. 10 6  Because of his personal involvement, the trial judge
held that McDonald was "estopped to claim the illegality" and dismissed
the complaint. 10 7 In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme
Court of Florida, referring to McDonald, said "[o]ne cannot stand by
with full knowledge and acquiesce in this type of conduct prior to an
election and then, after being disappointed by the results, successfully
overturn the election."
' 10 8
The next case that substantively addressed the issue of fraud was
the 1975 Boardman decision."°  Like McDonald, fraud was not an
expressed consideration in the disposition of this case; unlike McDon-
ald, there was a complete absence of fraud in the election being chal-
lenged. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the primary holding in this case
addressed the adoption of the substantial compliance doctrine. Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court of Florida appeared concerned that a more lib-
eral interpretation of the absentee voting laws might lead to increased
fraud, adversely affecting the integrity of future elections. After noting
that "accommodation of the public has become the primary basis for the
privilege of voting absentee,"1 ' the court established that the test to
determine when an irregularity in absentee voting would lead to invali-
dation was, simply, "whether or not the irregularity complained of has
prevented a full, fair and free expression of the public will." '' With
respect to what a court should do when absentee voting irregularities
have frustrated the public will, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
general rule of Frink v. State ex rel. Turk:'1 2 "[W]here the number of
invalid absentee ballots is more than enough to change the result of the





106. See id. at 128-29. Sheriff McDonald was witness to the improper conduct of John Dobbs
and a person identified only as "the man Beardon." Id. at 128.
107. Id. at 127.
108. Id. at 129.
109. See Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
110. Id. at 264.
111. Id. at 265.
112. 160 Fla. 394 (1948).
113. Boardman, 323 So. 2d. at 268.
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In summarizing its decision, the court announced what have
become known as the "Boardman factors," all three of which must be
considered when determining whether irregularities in the absentee bal-
lots cause all absentee votes to be invalidated.1 4 These factors are: "(a)
the presence or absence of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrong-
doing; (b) whether there has been substantial compliance with the
essential requirements of the absentee voting law; and (c) whether the
irregularities complained of adversely affect the sanctity of the ballot
and the integrity of the election.""' 5
In announcing these factors, the Boardman court seemed to suggest
that the "general rule" first announced in Frink might not apply where
there is evidence of absentee ballot fraud. That is, even if the number of
illegal absentee ballots was insufficient to change the results of the elec-
tion, a court could invalidate all absentee votes when it found substantial
fraud.
That view, however, was left undecided. In the absence of fraud,
the Boardman court applied the substantial compliance doctrine, found
only eighty-eight of the 1,450 absentee votes at issue to be invalid and
declared the petitioner, who had earned 249 more votes overall than his
opponent, to be the winner.11 6 Less than one decade later, however, the
Supreme Court of Florida would have to face the issue of absentee voter
fraud head-on.
The 1984 Bolden v. Potter117 decision was the first case after the
enactment of Florida's original absentee voting statute in 1917 in which
a Florida appellate court expressly found election fraud and, by reinstat-
ing the trial court's judgment, supported the application of the invalida-
tion remedy.
118
At the trial court level, the Bolden case involved a challenge to a
1978 county school board election. 19 Potter received ninety-nine more
total votes than his opponent, Bolden, although Bolden had eighteen
more votes on the voting machines. 120 Bolden therefore contested the
validity of the absentee ballots. In the ensuing trial:
114. See id. at 269.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 270. In his suit, Esteva alleged that "some 1450 irregularities or errors in the
absentee ballots" existed. Id. at 261. In the end, the court determined that eighty-eight were
illegally cast and therefore invalid. See id. at 270.
117. 452 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1984).
118. See id. at 567. As discussed in the text, infra, the court did not expressly apply the
invalidation remedy itself; it simply quashed the intermediate appellate court's order allowing the
election results to stand and reinstated the trial court's judgment invalidating all absentee ballots
and declaring the winner based solely on the machine vote.
119. See Potter v. Bolden, 416 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
120. See id.
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approximately 75 witness ...testified about corrupt election prac-
tices including the sale of votes. The record reflects that 46 electors
admitted that their ballots had been bought and that 70 additional
ballots were witnessed by the same persons who had witnessed the
bought ballots and conducted the organized vote-buying operation.
In addition, 10 other ballots were witnessed by individuals who had
no contact with the respective voters and no independent knowledge
of such voters or the nature of their signatures. The individual candi-
dates were not charged with being personally responsible for the
fraudulent practices and there was no evidence suggesting that they
were involved. 
121
Concluding that "the fraud and illegal activities . . . were so con-
spicuously corrupt and pervasive that it ha[d] tainted the entire absentee
voting procedure,"12 1 the trial court invalidated all absentee votes cast in
the election.
The appeal of this decision eventually led to a significant shift in
opinion concerning when courts should apply the invalidation remedy.
At the intermediate appellate court level, the First District Court of
Appeal based its opinion on the "general rule" first announced in Frink
and reiterated in Boardman that, before invalidating all absentee ballots,
the trial court must first find that the number of illegal ballots could, if
considered as a group, change the results of the election. 123 The appel-
late court noted that the trial judge invalidated only forty-seven of 361
absentee ballots124 and then observed that, despite the "malodorous elec-
tion activities described in [its] final judgment,"1 25 the trial court did not
make a finding of a sufficient number of illegal absentee ballots [ninety-
nine] to invalidate all the absentee votes. 1 2 6 The appellate court then
concluded: "[W]e think that neither intuition nor suspicion is a valid
basis upon which to disenfranchise the voters who cast the other 314
absentee ballots."'
127
The Florida Supreme Court was far more concerned about the fraud
issue. At the outset, the court noted that it had jurisdiction because the
intermediate appellate court's decision conflicted with its decision in
Boardman.128 After recounting the details of the organized vote-buying
that occurred in this election, the court then addressed its disagreement
with the intermediate appellate court's decision. Essentially, the court
121. Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 1984).
122. Potter, 416 So. 2d at 7.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 7-8.
126. See id. at 8.
127. Id.
128. See Bolden, 452 So. 2d at 565.
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concluded that Frink's so-called "general rule" does not apply in cases
where "there is present fraud and intentional wrongdoing [that] clearly
affect the sanctity of the ballot and the integrity of the election pro-
cess."' 12 9 The court clearly disagreed with the intermediate appellate
court's ruling that a trial court must establish that a sufficient number of
ballots are tainted before invalidating all absentee ballots.1 3 °
Instead, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Bolden that "[o]nce
substantial fraud or corruption has been established to the extent that it
permeated the election process, it is unnecessary to demonstrate with
mathematical certainty that the number of fraudulently cast ballots actu-
ally affected the outcome of the election." '131 The court then determined
that the record reflected that over thirty percent of the absentee ballots
were tainted, and that over ten percent of the absentee voters admitted
they had sold their vote. 32 Consequently, the court concluded that
"[w]hen substantial fraudulent vote-buying practices are clearly shown
to have been involved, the election must be declared void."' 33 Without
expressly addressing the appropriate remedy, however, the court
remanded the case to the intermediate appellate court with instructions
to reinstate the trial court's judgment that ordered the invalidation of all
absentee ballots.' 34
Thus, the Boardman court (apparently to help deter any corruption
that might accompany the adoption of the substantial compliance doc-
trine) suggested that, where there was evidence of substantial absentee
voter fraud, a court might apply the invalidation remedy even when the
number of tainted ballots would not have changed the result of the elec-
tion. 35 Later, the Bolden court eliminated any doubt on this issue,
explicitly holding that, where there is evidence of substantial fraud, the
trial court may void an election even though the number of infected
absentee ballots was less than the number needed to change the results
of the election.' 36
B. The Appellate Court's Invalidation Remedy
A decade later, the appellate court in Matter of Protest relied heav-
ily on the weight of the precedent discussed above.' 37 It found the argu-
129. Id. at 566.
130. Id.




135. See supra text accompanying notes 109-116.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 117-134.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 138-140.
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ment in Bolden especially relevant, as the only case where the Florida
Supreme Court has explicitly addressed substantial absentee ballot
fraud.138 The appellate court noted that the Bolden court "expressly
approve[d] the trial court's remedy, which was to invalidate all of the
absentee ballots." '13 9 Although the appellate court correctly recognized
that neither Boardman nor Bolden categorically state that invalidation is
the exclusive remedy for massive absentee ballot fraud, it was comforta-
ble, after viewing the matter from a historical perspective, in concluding
that courts have applied the invalidation remedy consistently since the
1930s.' 4 °
Not satisfied with only one line of reasoning, the appellate court
offered two additional arguments supporting the invalidation of all
absentee ballots in the Miami election. The first argument suggested
that the trial court's remedy was simply unprecedented in Florida case
law. 4 ' The appellate court, however, subtly qualified this argument in
two ways. First, it limited its scope to previous cases where there was
massive absentee voter fraud. 4 2 Historically, this would limit the pos-
sibilities in Florida to one case: Bolden. Second, the appellate court
excluded consideration of any similar case not reaching the appellate
level.' 43 Consequently, it would not need to expressly consider a trial
judge's opinion in a strikingly similar case where the judge ordered a
new election, and neither candidate appealed the order. This happened
in the contested 1993 Hialeah mayoral election, discussed in more detail
below.
The second argument the appellate court made to support its invali-
dation remedy was that strong public policy considerations required the
court to discourage fraud. 44 Citing testimony of Miami-Dade County
Supervisor of Elections David Leahy, the court agreed that the trial
court's order for a new election sent the wrong message. 45 Leahy's
138. See Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170, supra note 5, at 1172-73. The court recognized
Bolden as "[a]n important decision concerning the issue of the appropriate remedy to be provided
upon a finding that absentee ballot fraud has affected the electorial process".
139. Id. at 1173.
140. See id. The Third District Court stated "that form of remedy [i.e., using the machine vote
only] has, historically, been consistently approved since the 1930's."
141. See id. at 1173-75. The court stated at one point, "[W]e note a complete absence of any
Florida Appellate Court decision upholding the ordering of a new election in the face of such
fraudulent conduct relating to absentee ballots .... [C]onsistent with the fact that there is no legal
precedent in Florida to support the action of the trial court in ordering a new election as the proper
remedy upon finding of massive absentee voter fraud." The appellate court concluded, "[Wie find
that such a remedy is not warranted by Florida legal precedent."
142. See id. at 1174.
143. See id. at 1173.
144. See id. at 1174.
145. See id.
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concern was that candidates would recognize that the worst that could
happen to them in an election marred by fraud is that they would get
another chance to win, 46 assuming of course that the candidates were
cleared of any personal criminal involvement. 47
Bolstered by precedent and fearful of the message that the trial
court's remedy might send, the appellate court invalidated all absentee
votes in the Miami mayoral election. This comment now addresses the
remedy rejected by the appellate court.
V. THE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY: NEW ELECTION
Although rejected by the appellate court in Matter of Protest, the
remedy applied by the trial court ordering a new election within a speci-
fied time frame was a legitimate remedy based on previous cases both in
Florida and in other jurisdictions.
A. Trial Court's Statutory Discretion
It is important to note at the outset that when a candidate or an
elector in Florida protests an election based on fraud, the trial judge
hearing the protest has wide discretion in providing a remedy. Accord-
ing to the controlling Florida statute, 48 a judge has authority to "fashion
such orders as he or she may deem necessary to ensure that such allega-
tion is investigated, examined, or checked; to prevent or correct such
fraud; or to provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances." '149
What, then, was the trial judge thinking when he ordered a new
election for Miami Mayor. Did he properly consider the weight of Flor-
ida precedent supporting the invalidation of the absentee votes in a case
like this? Arguably, circuit courts are the most overworked courts in the
state system. A single judge hears each case. This judge is most likely
without a law clerk to assist in formulating opinions, and he or she may
have only limited support staff. 5° Consequently, the court may not give
complete consideration to the available range of options to be found
both inside and outside the court's jurisdiction. This is especially true if
146. See id.
147. Neither Leahy nor the Third District Court raises this issue. Any candidate found to be a
party to voter fraud would be liable under Fla. Stat. § 104.041 for a third degree felony, which in
theory could make "the worst that could happen" a prison sentence. See FLA. STAT. § 104.41
(West 1977).
148. See generally FLA. STAT. § 102.166(11)(b) (1995).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Information in this paragraph was distilled from informal discussions with Judge Gerald
T. Wetherington, formerly of the Eleventh Circuit Court, Miami-Dade County, and Judge William
P. Dimitrouleas, presently sitting on the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.
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counsel for the respective parties fail to bring all relevant cases to the
judge's attention.'
5 1
In the Miami mayoral-election case, however, the trial judge
received some dedicated legal support 152 and, considering the legal
memoranda submitted to him, 53 was apparently aware of the relevant
case law. In fact, the trial record indicates that Carollo argued forcefully
for the invalidation remedy later applied by the appellate court.154
Carollo's argument discussed the historical development of this remedy
(albeit superficially) and invoked the power of both Boardman and
Bolden, stating that "[t]he evidence presented in this case conclusively
demonstrates that all of the three inquiries [or "factors"] in Bolden and
Boardman are both satisfied and dispositive."' 55 He then made an even
more important legal point: "[A] distinct legal standard applies to
absentee ballot challenges where ... the election is marked by the pres-
ence of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing."'' 56 He next
restated the Bolden holding that "once substantial fraud is established, it
is unnecessary to demonstrate with mathematical certainty that the
number of fraudulently cast ballots actually affected the outcome of the
election."'' 57  Finally, he concluded that "when viewed through the
appropriate legal standard, the overwhelming evidence of such irregular-
ities compels that this court reject the absentee ballots in their
entirety."
58
B. The "New Election" Remedy
When one looks at the record in some detail, it is clear that the trial
judge based his decision to order a new election on a set of factors and
relevant case law that, in his view, made a new election more appropri-
ate than invalidating all of the absentee ballots. Although the record is
not completely clear, the judge may have chosen this remedy for at least
three possible reasons: (1) invalidation would disenfranchise a signifi-
cant number of absentee voters; (2) it would punish Suarez where there
was no evidence to suggest he was personally involved in the fraudulent
activity; and (3) it would reward Carollo with a judicial victory that may
not have reflected the will of the people. Point one is the most powerful
151. Id.
152. Interview with Judge Thomas S. Wilson, Jr., Circuit Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit
(Dec. 20, 1998). In Matter of Protest, Judge Wilson had the dedicated support of one lawyer from
a group of lawyers assigned to support the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
153. See Petitioner's Trial Mem. of Law at 11, Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 09.
154. See id. at 22-24.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id. (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1984)).
158. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
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of the three and will require an analysis in some detail, including a
review of the relevant Florida case law. It will therefore be addressed
last.
With respect to the trial court's unwillingness to punish Suarez, the
court, in its final judgment, concluded that it was "very mindful that no
evidence was presented that Mr. Suarez knew about or participated in
this fraud." '159 The court therefore did not think it appropriate to invali-
date all of the absentee votes and declare Carollo the winner.16° Thus, it
implicitly connected any lack of Suarez's involvement in the fraud to its
remedy of ordering a new election. It made this statement despite the
fact that Carollo had argued that, under Bolden, "it makes no difference
whether the fraud is committed by candidates, election officials, or third
parties .... As long as the fraud, from whatever source, is such that the
true result of the election cannot be ascertained with reasonable cer-
tainty, the ballots affected should be invalidated."'
6 1
Second, although not expressly stated in its final judgment, the trial
court may have been concerned that invalidating all of the absentee
votes and declaring Carollo the winner would possibly thwart the will of
the people of the City of Miami. The court, of course, knew that Suarez
had won a runoff election just nine days after the November 4 elec-
tion.162 Moreover, in the second election, Suarez received more votes
than did Carollo, both at the polls and in the absentee voting. 6 3 Even if
the absentee ballots were infected with fraud in this later election, as
Carollo alleged in two separate suits,' 64 a clear majority of voters at the
polls now preferred Suarez to Carollo. The results of the runoff showed
that the citizens did not unequivocally support Carollo. Thus, in the
absence of finding Suarez personally involved in the fraud, the trial
court might reasonably have looked beyond the facts in Bolden and con-
sidered ordering a new election for a final determination. This would be
especially true if the court had been reluctant to disenfranchise honest
voters.
The third and perhaps most significant point in the argument in
opposition to the invalidation remedy is that it disenfranchises honest
absentee voters. The trial court's final judgment explicitly, if not force-
159. Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 09, supra note 2, at 4.
160. See id.
161. Petitioner's Trial Mem. of Law at 11-12, Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 09.
162. See Respondent's Trial Mem. of Law, Matter of Protest, No 97-25596 CA 09.
163. See Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170, supra note 5, at 1172.
164. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 3, Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170. Following the
November 13 run-off election, Carollo filed two separate suits alleging substantial absentee voter
fraud in the November 13 election, both of which were consolidated for discovery purposes only
with the action litigated under Matter of Protest.
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fully, made this concern an integral part of its decision. Quoting Board-
man, the court first emphasized where its priority would lie, stating that
"the real parties in interest ... are the voters."'165 Then, after noting that
the federal and state constitutions guarantee citizens the right to vote, the
court stressed that "[w]e must tread carefully on that right or we risk
unnecessary and unjustified muting of the public voice."'166 Finally, fol-
lowing an analysis showing that fraud had adversely affected the elec-
tion, and after determining that Suarez was not personally involved in
this fraud, the court concluded that it was not appropriate "to disen-
franchise the honest absentee voters"'167 by invalidating the absentee bal-
lots in their entirety.
As discussed in an earlier part of this Comment, Florida courts have
been concerned with disenfranchisement over the years, even as they
have applied the invalidation remedy. The concern over disenfranchise-
ment was first expressly raised in 1936 in Titus v. Peacock. 68 In that
case, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to invalidate a relatively
large number of absentee ballots because the absentee voters had done
everything they were required by law to do. 16 9 The problem was with
the election officials and the state's absentee voting laws, a portion of
which were later found to be unconstitutional.' 70 The court concluded
that "an erroneous or even unlawful handling of the ballots by the elec-
tion officers . . . will not be held to have disfranchised such voters by
throwing out their votes."''
A little more than a decade later in Frink, the court was less under-
standing. After applying the strict compliance doctrine to a set of absen-
tee ballots because the supporting affidavits were technically flawed in
only minor ways, the court defended its action by stating that absentee
voting was not a right but a privilege granted by the state legislature. 72
Further, it said that to protect the "purity of elections and the sanctity of
the ballot,"1 73 courts must strictly interpret these laws. ' 7 It concluded
that, in the end, when voters fail to follow these laws (even through no
fault of their own), "It is not a case of disfranchising ... voter[s]; [they]
failed to comply with the law and for that reason [their] ballot[s] [were]
165. Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 09, supra note 2, at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. 170 So. 309 (Fla. 1936).
169. See id. at 310.
170. See id.; see also discussion, supra note 52.
171. Id.
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properly rejected." '
Later, in Parra v. Harvey,'76 decided in the mid-1950s, an unsuc-
cessful candidate for City Commissioner sought to invoke the reasoning
in Titus, making him the winner of the election.177 He contended that:
the absentee voters did all the law required of them and ... the irreg-
ularities held by the [trial court] to have rendered the ballots void
should be charged to the default of the election officials and should
not be held to have deprived the persons who cast the absentee ballots
of the right to express a choice at a "fair election."'
178
The Florida Supreme Court, however, was moved more by its reasoning
in Frink, reiterating that absentee voting is not a right but a privilege
granted by statute.1 79 Reciting a familiar argument, it reasoned that to
avoid the possibility of dishonest elections the absentee voting statutes
must be strictly applied "because they are not designed to insure a vote
but rather to permit a vote in a manner not provided by common law."'8 0
In Boardman, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the disen-
franchisement problem by expanding the number of questionable ballots
that might be held to be valid. Consistent with Boardman, therefore,
election officials could count challenged ballots so long as there was
substantial compliance with the absentee voting statute. As a measure of
Boardman's significance, one need only look at the earlier cases where
courts overturned an election as a result of requiring strict compliance
with the absentee voting laws. Had the courts followed the substantial
compliance rule in those cases, they probably would not have overturned
the elections because most of the challenged ballots would have techni-
cally passed the "substantial compliance" test.'
A decade later, in Bolden, the Florida Supreme Court unaccounta-
bly did not address the issue of disenfranchisement, despite noting that
the intermediate appellate court had found it to be an important consid-
175. Id.
176. 89 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1956).
177. See id. at 872.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. See, e.g., Frink, 35 So. 2d at 12 (holding 698 absentee ballots were void because the
supporting affidavits, pre-printed by the city, were not in compliance with the voting statute); see
also Griffin v. Knoth, 67 So. 2d at 431, 432 (Fla. 1953) (invalidating all absentee ballots because a
sufficient number of applications contained a statement that the voter would be away from the
municipality rather than the county as prescribed by the voting statute); Wood v. Diefenbach, 81
So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955) (concluding all 100 absentee ballots were void since the supporting
applications were not made out correctly or at all); Parra, 89 So. 2d at 872 (invalidating all
absentee ballots because the court found a sufficient number that were not returned in person or by
mail, were cast by electors who stated they would be absent from the city and not the county, or
were simply not filled out properly).
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eration in its decision.18 2 The court was apparently more concerned with
refining its holding in Boardman in instances where there is a finding of
substantial fraud than with addressing the issue of disenfranchisement,
which invariably follows invalidation.
The issue of disenfranchisement, however, was a controlling factor
in the more recent case of Juri v. Canvassing Board of Hialeah."3 The
Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in
Miami, reviewed the unseemly 1993 election for the Mayor of the City
of Hialeah - an election scandal strikingly similar to the mayoral elec-
tion that is the focus of this Comment.
C. The 1993 Hialeah Election: Relevant?
Even discounting the overzealous and unscrupulous manner in
which the opposing camps conducted their campaigns, the results of the
Hialeah election seemed to beg for a protest. Of the 28,807 votes cast at
the polling places, challenger Nilo Juri received only 105 more votes
than did his opponent, longtime political rival and incumbent Mayor,
Raul Martinez.1 8 4 Martinez, however, received 826 absentee votes and
Mr. Juri only 448. As a result Martinez was victorious, receiving 273
more total votes.185 Ten days later, Juri protested the election, contend-
ing that fraud, intentional wrongdoing, and gross negligence permeated
the absentee ballot process and tainted the entire election.18 6 Juri asked
the court to discard all the absentee ballots and declare him the winner
based solely on the machine vote.18 7 Thus, Juri sought the court's appli-
cation of the invalidation remedy which, as previously discussed, had
been widely applied by Florida courts since the 1939 Whitley decision.
As in all recent cases involving absentee voter fraud, the trial court
grounded its opinion on the Florida Supreme Court's holdings in Board-
man and Bolden. Relying on Boardman, it first noted that "[tihe pri-
mary consideration in an election contest is whether the will of the
people has been [a]ffected"' 88 and then laid out the three "Boardman
factors,"'8 9 establishing when a court may invalidate an election because
of misconduct involving the absentee vote. Citing Bolden the court con-
cluded that where there is evidence of substantial fraud, "[s]o long as the
fraud, from whatever source, is such that the true result of the election
182. See Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1984).
183. No. 93-21848 (04) and No. 94-04341 (04) (Fla. Dade County Ct. Nov. 7, 1994).
184. See id. at 1-2.
185. See id. at 2. The arithmetic is as follows: 14,540 minus 14,267 equals 273.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 4.
188. Id. at 2.
189. See id. The court paraphrases but does not quote Boardman.
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cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the ballots affected must
be invalidated."' 90
With respect to fraud, the trial court in Juri made three important
findings. First, after hearing testimony from thirty-two witnesses and
considering 120 depositions and over 170 exhibits, the court concluded
that fraudulent activity infected the absentee voting and the integrity of
the election as a whole, but that it could not determine the exact number
of ballots affected.'91 Second, the evidence suggested that supporters
for both candidates acted fraudulently. 9 2 Third, there was no evidence
presented "to establish that either Raul Martinez or Nilo Juri directly
participated in or had knowledge of any improprieties in the absentee
ballot process."
' 19 3
Given that both parties participated in the absentee ballot fraud
found to have occurred in Juri, the trial court determined that it was
inappropriate to invalidate all the absentee votes because "[tihis would
invariably invite similar [fraudulent] conduct in the future, a situation
which must be avoided."' 94 Ironically, this is the same argument the
Supreme Court of Florida made in Bolden to invalidate all absentee
votes. There, the court said failure to invalidate will "cause the electo-
rate to lose confidence in the electoral process, destroy the willingness
of individuals to participate, and thereby allow our government to be
controlled by corrupt influences." '95
Despite finding that fraud substantially affected the absentee ballot
process, the Juri court could not determine exactly how many of the
1,274 absentee ballots cast were invalid. It was therefore reluctant to
disenfranchise those who voted legally, which in this case the court
thought could be well over a 1,000 voters.'96 The court concluded, "We
would be telling a large number of electors their votes did not count.
That result would be as unfair and unacceptable as the requirement of
the payment of a poll tax or an election limited to a certain gender or
race."' 19 7 Again, this view conflicted with Bolden, where the Florida
Supreme Court said, "Once substantial fraud or corruption has been
established ... it is unnecessary to demonstrate with mathematical cer-
tainty that the number of fraudulently cast ballots actually affected the
190. Id. at 5.
191. See id. at 3-4.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. at 5.
195. Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1984).
196. See Juri, No. 93-21848 (04) & No. 94-04341 (04) at 5.
197. Id. at 5-6.
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outcome of the election."' 98 Notwithstanding the Bolden precedent, the
Juri court declared the election invalid and ordered a new mayoral elec-
tion within thirty days.1 99 Neither party appealed this decision.
In retrospect, the trial court in Juri introduced an element that Flor-
ida courts had not previously expressed, but probably considered when
fashioning a remedy to a finding of absentee voter fraud: the relative
culpability of parties in the improper conduct. The court underscored
the fact that both sides (though apparently not their principals) were
found to have taken part in the fraudulent conduct.2 °° Because it could
not find that one side was more blameworthy than the other, the court
decided neither should benefit directly from its decision. The court may
have also considered that Juri, despite having won a majority at the pol-
ling place, lacked a clear mandate.201 Consequently, the court could
more comfortably disregard the weight of Florida precedent (particularly
Bolden) suggesting that all absentee votes be invalidated, and therefore
refuse to declare Juri the winner based solely on the machine vote.
Aside from Juri, plenty of out-of-state case law supported the trial
court's new election remedy in Matter of Protest.
D. Other State Jurisdictions: Persuasive Support
While precedent for a new election where there is a finding of mas-
sive fraud in absentee voting is admittedly absent in Florida appellate
case law, ample support can be found in other jurisdictions. Indeed,
conducting a new election is the remedy of choice both at the federal
level202 and in other states, 20 3 while the invalidation remedy remains
almost entirely a Florida remedy.20"
198. Bolden, 452 So. 2d at 567.
199. See Juri, No. 93-21848(04) & 94-04341(04) at 6.
200. See id. at 5.
201. See id. at 1-2. Juri received 13,819 machine votes, while Martinez received 13,714. This
is a difference of 105 votes or less than four-tenths of one percent of the total machine votes cast.
202. See Robertson, supra note 57, at 898. The author supports her conclusion that ordering a
new election is the most popular remedy for election fraud by citing several federal cases from the
United States Supreme Court to the federal district court level. See id. at 898 n.158.
203. See infra notes 206-230 and accompanying text, discussing new election remedy used in
Massachusetts, California, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana.
204. See Robertson, supra note 57, at 921. Footnote 328 lists cases that support "the remedy
of counting the machine vote only." Id. Of the cases listed, all but two are from Florida. In the
two non-Florida cases, the author misread, in each case, the court's holding. In one, Gooch v.
Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321 (Cal. 1993), the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision ordering new school board elections because there was sufficient evidence that the
winners in each of the elections won handily primarily because of illegal voting. See id. at 1332-
33. In the other, Byron v. Tyler, 398 A.2d 599 (N.J. 1978), the Superior Court of New Jersey in
fact did not invalidate all the absentee votes; because it was possible to identify and suppress the
illegal absentee votes, the court invalidated only those that were improperly cast. Consequently,
the court allowed twenty-eight of the seventy-nine absentee ballots in the Fieldsboro election to be
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Other states have applied the new election remedy to elections free
of fraud as well as those involving substantial fraud. For example, in
McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters of Brockton2 °5 a non-fraud case, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts responded to a petition chal-
lenging the results of a state mayoral election. The losing candidate in
that case, McCavitt, contested several absentee ballots not because of
voter fraud, but because they did not comply with the state's absentee
voting statute. 0 6 The court, citing Boardman among other cases, con-
cluded that a sufficient number of the absentee ballots were not in sub-
stantial compliance with the voting statute, thus casting doubt on the
election results.2z 7 Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's
decision declaring McCavitt the winner and ordered a new election.20 8
Fifteen years later, in Penta v. City of Revere,2 9 a Massachusetts
appellate court relied heavily on McCavitt to overturn the results of a
municipal election decided by four votes. In that case, the losing candi-
date alleged but did not prove fraud by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 21  The court did find, however, that at least eleven absentee
votes were not in substantial compliance with the voting statute.211 Per-
haps more importantly, the court noted that "the facts [surrounding this
election], taken together, convey a strong appearance of impropriety. 212
After discussing the improper actions of a precinct official and workers
in his office, the court concluded, "Not to require a new election under
these circumstances would undermine public confidence in the election
laws. 213
The new election remedy has also been applied in cases involving
absentee ballot fraud, or similar illegal conduct. In Gooch v. Hendrix,21 4
for example, the Supreme Court of California found that a political asso-
ciation's illegal involvement in the absentee voting process substantially
undermined the results of five different school board elections.21 5 On
counted. See id. at 603-4. Thus, the invalidation remedy, evidently, has only been applied in
Florida, assuming Robertson's listing is complete.
205. 434 N.E.2d 620 (Mass. 1982). Courts in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and Illinois
have cited this case. The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Huggins v. County of Navajo, 788 P.2d 81
(Ariz. 1990), rejected the new election remedy and instead chose to prorate the illegal absentee
votes among the candidates in each precinct as best it could.
206. See McCavitt, 434 N.E. 2d at 623.
207. See id. at 628, 631.
208. See id. at 631.
209. 1997 WL 799478 (Mass. Super. Dec 23, 1997).
210. See id. at 4.
211. See id. at 12.
212. Id. at 12 n.20.
213. Id.
214. 851 P.2d 1321 (Cal. 1993).
215. See id. at 1332-33.
20001
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
appeal, that court concluded that the trial court was correct in setting
aside the election results and ordering new elections,216 "where clear and
convincing evidence established pervasive illegalities that permeated the
election process. '"217
In Rogers v. Holder,21 8 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered a
new election for sheriff even though only sixteen one-hundredths of one
percent (0.16) of the absentee votes were found to have been fraudu-
lently cast.219 The court determined that, despite the low number of
votes where fraud could be proven beyond a reasonable certainty, it was
nonetheless impossible to discern the will of the voters. 220 Faced as it
was with a "reasonable inference" of fraud by the supporters of the win-
ning candidate, the court ordered a special election.
221
A few years after Rogers, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed
the issue of absentee voter irregularities in McCranie v. Mullis.222 The
trial court documented a sufficient number of illegal absentee ballots to
cast doubt on the election results.223 For example, several electors voted
twice, and one vote was cast in the name of a dead person.224 Further, in
the Office of the Registrar of Elections, "one individual alone assisted
142... absentee voters. The record shows that this individual was mar-
ried to the secretary of a candidate. 225 The court voided the election
and ordered a new one.226
Finally, in Valence v. Rosiere,227 a Louisiana intermediate appellate
court reversed a trial court's decision to dismiss a challenge to a mayoral
election that was won by seventeen votes.228 The appellate court found
that the losing candidate's allegations - that up to twenty absentee bal-
lots had been forged - provided an adequate basis challenging the elec-
tion. 229 The court also noted that if, upon remand, the allegations were
substantiated, the trial judge was to order either a totally new election or
a restricted election, specifying the candidates and indicating which vot-
216. See id. at 1333.
217. Id. at 1331.
218. 636 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1994).
219. See id. at 651.
220. See id. at 650-51. The court applied the second of a two-prong test. It had determined
that no new election was required under the first prong because of the insufficient number of
tainted absentee ballots. See id. at 650.
221. See id. at 651-52.
222. 478 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. 1996).
223. See id. at 379.
224. See id. at n.6.
225. Id. at 329.
226. See id.
227. 675 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 1996).
228. See id. at 1139.
229. See id. at 1141.
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ers were eligible to vote.23°
Perhaps influenced by the weight of the out-of-state precedent sup-
porting a new election and bolstered by the Juri decision,231 the trial
court in Matter of Protest ordered a new election within sixty days.232
VI. ANALYSIS
To a certain degree, the divergent decisions in this case reflect the
unsatisfactory nature of the controlling precedent.233 Boardman, a
widely respected, watershed decision, sustained the practice of invalidat-
ing elections when the number of illegal absentee ballots is sufficiently
large to change the results of the election. At the same time, it suggested
that, where evidence of substantial fraud affecting the integrity of the
election exists, a smaller number of illegally cast votes would support
the invalidation of all absentee ballots. The Bolden court sought to elim-
inate this ambiguity in the Boardman opinion by holding that, irrespec-
tive of the number of affected absentee votes, where there has been
enough fraud or corruption that the true results of the election could not
be determined with reasonable certainty, the remedy should be invalida-
tion of all absentee votes. Yet the invalidation remedy adopted by
Bolden may not be appropriate for all circumstances where a court finds
massive absentee voter fraud. This section begins with a critical look at
both of the Matter of Protest decisions, starting with the appellate
court's opinion, and then suggests a way to get out of the box created by
Bolden.
A. Appellate Court's Decision
The appellate court's decision in Matter of Protest disenfranchised
a large bloc of honest absentee voters, arguably unnecessarily, to prevent
Suarez from getting another chance to win the election. The court's rea-
soning, however, was flawed: First, the court inadequately analyzed
Florida precedent and other relevant case law. Second, and closely
230. See id. at 1139-40 n.1.
231. It is impossible to tell by looking at the trial court's final judgment whether it was
influenced in any way by Juri, since it did not cite or in any way refer to Juri or the Hialeah
election. After being assigned this case, though, Judge Wilson did confer with Judge Shapiro,
who presided over the Juri trial. Interview with the Honorable Judge Thomas S. Wilson, Jr. (Dec.
20, 1998).
232. Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA 09, supra note 2, at 4.
233. Indeed, as Justice Overton remarked in his concurring opinion in Boardman, "A reading
of the election contest cases concerning absentee ballots reveals a maze of confusing doctrines and
rules. There are cases to sustain the position of both sides." Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259,
270 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., concurring). This Comment's view is that subsequent decisions
have, if anything, only further confused matters.
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related, it overzealously applied Bolden. Third, it attempted to reinforce
its reliance on precedent with a facile public policy argument.
With respect to Florida precedent and other case law, the appellate
court's analysis fell short in three significant ways. First, the appellate
court exaggerated the extent to which Florida case law demanded the
invalidation remedy applied in the Matter of Protest case. Although
Florida courts have applied the invalidation remedy for more than sixty
years, the cases decided before Boardman dealt with an entirely different
context, one dominated by the doctrine of strict compliance to the absen-
tee voting statutes.231 With Boardman, the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the substantial compliance doctrine, significantly affecting the
application of any remedy for absentee voter irregularities.2 35 But the
seminal case on absentee voter fraud is neither Whitley nor Boardman,
but the 1984 Bolden decision.236 Before Bolden, neither the Florida
Supreme Court, nor any intermediate appellate court, had expressly
addressed absentee voter fraud.237 Moreover, the appellate court's opin-
ion admitted that earlier Florida cases "[did] not explicitly state that the
exclusive remedy for massive absentee voter fraud is to determine the
election solely based on machine vote. ' 238 Thus, its later insistence that
any remedy for absentee voter fraud other than invalidation would vio-
late a longstanding precedent is not persuasive.
Second, in distinguishing Rogers v. Holder,2 39 the appellate court
overlooked the important ways the two cases were similar. In Rogers,
the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to invalidate all absentee votes
when only twelve absentee ballots were fraudulently cast, instead order-
ing a special election that avoided the disenfranchisement of the large
number of honest absentee voters. 240 The appellate court in Matter of
Protest tried to distinguish Rogers: "In the instant case, the trial court
expressly found that the appellant, Carollo, met his burden of demon-
strating absentee ballot fraud to such a degree that 'the integrity of the
election was adversely affected.' "241 The extent of the absentee voter
fraud was admittedly much greater in the Miami election, a fact the
appellate court seemed to be driving at, but how the level of fraud deter-
mines which remedy applies is unclear. Nonetheless, both courts found
234. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 117-134 and accompanying text.
237. See discussion supra text, Part IV.A.2., and accompanying notes.
238. Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170, supra note 5, at 1173.
239. 636 So. 2d at 645 (Miss. 1994).
240. See id. at 651-52.
241. Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170, supra note 5, at 1174 (citation omitted).
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fraud sufficient to affect the outcome of the election, a fact that connects,
rather than distinguishes, these two cases.
Finally, the appellate court may have been technically correct when
it concluded there were no Florida appellate cases "upholding the order-
ing of a new election in the face of ... fraudulent conduct relating to
absentee ballots" 24 2 and that "there is no legal precedent in Florida to
support the action of the trial court in ordering a new election as the
proper remedy upon a find of massive absentee voter fraud. '243 How-
ever, in reaching this conclusion, it ignored the trial court's decision in
Juri (which neither party appealed) and, more importantly, the Juri
court's reasoning.
The second major flaw in the appellate court's opinion is its over-
zealous application of Bolden. Although an obviously important case in
the jurisprudence of absentee voter fraud in Florida and other jurisdic-
tions,2" Bolden is perhaps too categorical to be applied in the same
manner to all absentee voter fraud cases. For example, the Bolden court
said:
It makes no difference whether the fraud is committed by candidates,
election officials, or third parties. The evil to be avoided is the same,
irrespective of the source. As long as the fraud, from whatever the
source, is such that the true result of the election cannot be ascer-
tained with reasonable certainty, the ballots affected should be
invalidated. 45
As a practical matter, the "evil" may not be the same. It may make
a difference which party (or parties) perpetrated the fraudulent conduct.
As mentioned above, the McDonald court obviously considered the
nature and extent of Sheriff McDonald's and his supporters' fraudulent
activities when fashioning its remedy, even though there was no explicit
finding of fraud in that case. 46
It is impossible to tell whether the various courts hearing the
242. Id. at 1173.
243. Id. at 1174. As a matter of review, excluding the Third District Court in this case, the
only Florida intermediate appellate court that has taken up a case expressly involving massive
absentee voter fraud is the First District Court of Appeal in Potter v. Bolden, 416 So. 2d 6, 6 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982). It concluded that an insufficient number of absentee ballots were tainted so as to
trigger the invalidation remedy suggested by Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 259 (Fla.
1975). On appeal the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the First District, upholding the trial
court's application of the invalidation remedy. See Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla.
1984). Thus, the case law in this particularly narrow area of jurisprudence is remarkably limited.
244. The case has been widely cited in Alabama case law as well as in federal cases. See, e.g.,
Wells v. Ellis, 551 So. 2d 382 (Ala. 1989); Williams v. Lide, 628 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1993); Roe v.
Alabama, 676 So. 2d 1206 (Ala. 1995); Solomon v. Liberty County, 957 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Fla.
1997).
245. Bolden, 452 So. 2d at 567.
246. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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Bolden case were affected by which party or parties were responsible for
the fraud.247 None of the three Bolden opinions mentioned whether one
side was more blameworthy than the other, perhaps suggesting that both
sides contributed equally to the fraudulent activities. More importantly,
none of these courts seemed to have considered involvement in the fraud
as an expressed or implied basis for its decision. To these courts, the
issue was the number of infected votes needed to trigger the invalidation
remedy, and not much else.
In Juri, the circuit court expressly established that a party's
involvement in the fraud was an important factor in deciding whether to
order a new election.248 After reviewing Boardman and Bolden and
establishing that there had been substantial fraud adversely affecting the
sanctity of the ballots, the Juri court concluded that it would be
improper to invalidate all absentee votes when "that fraud [could] not be
attributed to the supporters of only one candidate. ' 249 Thus, where both
parties had been involved in the fraud, the Juri court found it preferable
to order a new election.2
When viewed from the single perspective of fault, the appellate
court's decision in Matter of Protest is logical. Because the Suarez sup-
porters were largely responsible for the absentee voter fraud, the appel-
late court could rationally apply the invalidation remedy as a penalty, in
effect punishing Suarez for the conduct of his supporters. However, the
court did not expressly present this as its rationale. Unfortunately, the
lack of express findings on involvement may produce undesirable results
in the future because it perpetuates the application of Bolden irrespective
of the circumstances surrounding the underlying finding of fraud.
The third flaw in the appellate court's opinion relates to the public
policy argument it offered to support its invalidation of all absentee
votes. The court suggested that ordering a new election would invite
further fraud.25" ' Because encouraging fraud is obviously not the public
policy of Florida, the appellate court invalidated all absentee ballots in
this election in an attempt to discourage fraud in future elections.252
Were it that simple, many other states would have adopted the invalida-
tion remedy; as noted earlier, however, it remains almost entirely a Flor-
247. See supra notes 117-134 and accompanying text.
248. See Juri, No. 93-21848 (04) & No. 94-04341 (04) at 5.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 6.
251. See Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d at 1170, supra note 5, at 1174.
252. See id. The court noted the trial testimony of Mr. David Leahy, Supervisor of Elections
for Miami-Dade County, which strongly implied that ordering a new election would encourage
further fraud.
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ida remedy.253 One plausible explanation for this apparent paradox is
that the vast majority of jurisdictions ordering new elections in the face
of massive absentee voter fraud believe that the invalidation remedy's
disenfranchisement of voters is more harmful than whatever value it has
in deterring further corruption. Thus, these jurisdictions appear to place
a greater premium on a voter's right to vote than does Florida.
The appellate court's public policy argument was superficial and
simplistic. The court obviously recognized, as Suarez had forcefully
contended, that invalidation would lead to disenfranchisement of honest
absentee voters. To counter this argument, the appellate court merely
turned it around, stating:
we refuse to disenfranchise the more than 40,000 voters who ...
exercised their constitutionally guaranteed right to vote in the polling
places of Miami. In the absence of any findings of impropriety relat-
ing to the machine vote in this election, public policy dictates that we
not void those constitutionally protected votes, the majority of which
were cast for Mr. Carollo.254
Yet, had Suarez prevailed in this litigation and had a new election
been held, none of these voters nor any of the absentee voters who voted
legally would have been disenfranchised. This is presuming of course
that they all would have chosen to once again exercise their right to vote.
B. Trial Court's Decision
Of the two decisions, the trial court's is the more difficult to
explain. As discussed above, the weight of state precedent clearly was
against ordering a new election. The court, however, limited its discus-
sion of precedent primarily to Boardman, emphasizing the view that the
real parties in interest in both cases were the voters whose right to vote
must be carefully guarded, and restating the three "Boardman fac-
tors. 255 It did not discuss Bolden, the more relevant and recent case,
although counsel for Carollo had suggested in its memorandum of law
that this later case established a "distinct legal standard" applicable to
absentee voter fraud cases.256 The trial court, possibly taking its lead
from cases in a number of other jurisdictions as well as the decision in
Juri, refused to disenfranchise the large number of absentee voters who
had cast their ballots legally and therefore ordered a new election.
Besides failing to explicitly address Bolden, the trial court's opinion had
two additional drawbacks. It overlooked the practical problems that the
253. See discussion, supra note 204.
254. Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d at 1170, supra note 25 at 1174.
255. See Matter of Protest, Case No. 97-25596 CA 09, supra note 2, at 1-2.
256. See Petitioners' Trial Mem. Law at 11-12 & 22, Matter of Protest, No. 97-25596 CA (09).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
City of Miami faced in resolving the mayoral election, and it failed to
adequately address the one-sided character of the fraudulent activity.
The trial court's opinion failed to resolve the practical problems
facing the City of Miami as a result of this political stand-off. The
implementation of its remedy, a new election, would have cost the tax-
payers time and money. While Miami voters waited two months to
return to the polls, they would have witnessed the two contenders waste
further resources challenging decisions about who should sit as the
interim Mayor. Also, the cost of another election would have resulted in
additional financial demands on an already fiscally challenged City
potentially affecting its other programs. The City had conducted a run-
off election only nine days after the November 4 election.257 In Juri, the
trial court ordered an election after thirty days. 258 Even assuming a new
election was the proper remedy in Matter of Protest, one could argue
that it should have been held much sooner than sixty days following the
court order, as directed by the trial court.
Perhaps even more troublesome, especially to Carollo, was that the
trial court's remedy appeared to ignore whose supporters were primarily
responsible for the wrongdoing. In his memorandum of law to the court,
Carollo argued that a new election was simply a temporary solution to a
more permanent problem.259 Carollo recalled the testimony of two
expert witnesses who had concluded that the court must avoid sending a
message to political consultants and candidates that, "if they were
caught committing fraud, the worst thing that would happen is that they
would get a 'second bite at the apple."' 260 To these witnesses a "change
of incumbency" was necessary in this election, "to excise the disease
rather than merely [treat] the symptoms. '26 They supported total inval-
idation of all of the absentee votes, which would have made Carollo the
winner.
Given this reasoning, a court order to conduct a new election might
better fit a set of circumstances where both sides participated in the
fraud more or less evenly. As suggested, this appeared to be the ration-
ale in Juri, where the court ordered a new election. In so doing, it
neither directly rewarded nor punished either party. In this case, how-
ever, one side (Suarez's) participated in the fraud to a much greater
extent then the other. The trial court, therefore, may have inappropri-
257. See Chronology, Mimii HERALD, Mar. 12, 1998, at Al.
258. See Juri, No. 93-21848 (04) & No. 94-04341 (04) at 6.
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ately applied the new election remedy to the wrong set of facts, unfairly
allowing Suarez another chance to win.
In critique of Carollo's reasoning, it is unclear what would happen
if, under similar circumstances after the invalidation all absentee votes,
the person whose supporters were responsible for the fraud won the
election. That is, taking the Miami election and presuming that Suarez
had won the machine vote (as he did in the run-off election), would
Carollo have so fervently argued for invalidation or would he have
sought to invoke the new election remedy?
In sum, the fundamental issue dividing the two opinions - and the
remedies applied in each - is as follows: is the harm of invalidation
(disenfranchising honest absentee voters) greater than the harm of
enfranchisement via a new election (allowing a candidate whose sup-
porters acted fraudulently to run again and possibly win)?
C. The Dilemma: Enfranchise or Invalidate?
Expansion of the franchise is supported by federal and state consti-
tutions and by statutes enacted to increase the number of citizens who
can vote in elections at all levels.262 In support of this expansion, many
states have passed voting laws limiting a judge's discretion to invalidate
ballots once they are cast.26 3 Consequently, the invalidation remedy
undermines this growing and widespread trend toward expanding the
franchise.
Beginning in 1936, when the Florida Supreme Court decided
Titus,2" Florida courts that have wrestled with absentee voting issues
have frequently expressed the desire to not unnecessarily disenfranchise
262. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-46-71 (1975) (preventing courts from annulling an election
unless a court determines the winning candidate received a number of illegal votes sufficient to
reduce his or her total below the number of votes needed to win); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-676 (C)
(1979) (stating in relevant part that "if it appears that a person other than the contestee has the
highest number of legal votes, the court shall declare that person elected") (emphasis added); CAL.
ELEcr. CODE § 16720 (West 1994) (declaring that courts, after hearing the arguments in a
contested election, shall immediately pronounce its judgment either setting aside the election or
decreeing the contestant the winner); LA. REv. STAT. § 18:1432 (West 1976) (authorizing trial
judges, where they find sufficient shifts in votes to change the results of the election as a result of
adding legal votes not tallied or subtracting illegal votes counted, to order an entirely new election
or a restricted election, specifying for the restricted election the date it will be held, the
appropriate candidates, the office or position for which the election will be held, and the voters
who are eligible to vote); MIsS. CODE § 23-15-951 (West 1972) (stating in relevant part that "the
verdict of the jury shall find the person with the greatest number of legal votes" the winner)
(emphasis added); TENN. CODE § 2-17-112 (1972) (declaring that, after hearing the case, the court
must confirm the election, declare it void, declare it a tie if two persons get the same number of
legal votes, or declare a person elected if that person receives the highest number of legal votes).
264. See discussion supra Part V.B and accompanying notes.
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absentee voters. At the same time, however, the courts have not hesi-
tated to invalidate absentee votes to maintain "the purity of elections and
the sanctity of the ballot. '265 In attempting to be consistent when faced
with the dilemma to enfranchise or invalidate, Florida courts have unfor-
tunately put themselves into a box of sorts. Where there is a finding of
massive absentee voter fraud and the true result of the election cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty, a court must, under Bolden, invali-
date all the absentee votes irrespective of the source of the fraud and
declare the winner based solely on the machine vote. Invalidation could,
however, lead to some unintended and unexpected results, as illustrated
in Figure 1 and explained further below.
By way of explanation, the left side of Figure 1 depicts six hypo-
thetical outcomes of an election between two candidates, Candidate A
and Candidate B, with the contest's overall winner highlighted. The
right side indicates how, with each hypothetical, the election would be
affected where a trial court finds substantial fraud in the campaign of
one or both candidates and applies the Bolden invalidation remedy.
FIGURE 1: POTENTIAL EFFECT OF BOLDEN ON AN ELECTION
Outcome After Applying Bolden
Election Results by Category Where Substantial Fraud Found in
Campaign of Following Candidate(s)
Hypo Machine Absentee Overall Candidate Candidate Candidates
# Vote Vote Winner A B A & B
1 A B A A A A
2 A B B A A A
3 B A B B B B
4 B A A B B B
5 A A A A A A
6 B B B B B B
In looking at this illustration, it is not surprising that under Bolden,
the results of the election change in two out of six instances (see hypo-
thetical 2 and 4). These results should be expected, given the intent of
the Florida courts to root out illegality, even at the expense of losing
honest votes. The matrix, simple as it may be, suggests the troublesome
potential effects of applying Bolden inflexibly. Looking at the right side
of Figure 1, for example, the candidate that wins the election remains the
same irrespective of the source of fraud. Thus, in the two instances cited
above where the results of the election change by applying Bolden, it is
possible that the winning candidate's own campaign may have been
265. Frink v. State ex rel. Turk, 35 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1948).
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responsible for the fraud.26 6 Even more problematic, the winning candi-
date in twelve out of eighteen instances (all highlighted), or sixty-seven
percent of the time, ran a campaign that benefited from its own fraudu-
lent activity. Thus, the application of Bolden would in some instances
reward illegal activity while at the same time, incredibly, disenfranchise
honest absentee voters.
Besides the potentially pernicious effect of applying Bolden inflexi-
bly, doing so conflicts with the black letter and, arguably, the spirit of
the controlling Florida statute. The applicable Florida Statute expressly
allows trial judges to apply any remedy appropriate to the circum-
stances.267 This wide latitude given by the statute contrasts sharply with
the holding of Bolden. Yet, the statute fits the circumstances much bet-
ter than Bolden.
The competing goals of maintaining the integrity of elections while
avoiding the disenfranchisement of honest absentee voters require courts
to balance opposing interests in light of the facts of the case under
review. In some cases, it may be imperative to invalidate all absentee
votes - in the process disenfranchising some honest absentee voters - to
keep from rewarding a candidate whose campaign was rife with fraud.
In other cases, it may be necessary to order a new election to avoid
disenfranchising voters, even though perpetrators of fraud would get
another chance to win at the polls.
VII. RESPONDING TO ABSENTEE VOTER FRAUD: A PROPOSAL
To give Florida courts greater flexibility when facing the dilemma
of whether to enfranchise or invalidate when fashioning a judicial
response to absentee ballot fraud, the following proposal is made:
Courts should explicitly determine where, by reasonable inference, the
fault for the voter fraud lies and then connect the remedy to the results of
that determination.
For example, if an election is held where Candidate A wins the
machine vote while Candidate B is the overall winner, then the remedy
266. Judge Williams' concurring opinion in the Boardman decision expressly raised a related
and equally unacceptable possibility. See Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 271 (Fla. 1975)
(Williams, J., concurring specially). After describing how an election worker sympathetic to a
candidate who appears to be winning the machine vote might intentionally alter the outer envelope
of some of the absentee ballots, Judge Williams continued:
without even knowing the contents of the ballots [inside the envelope] or caring, he
immediately makes certain that his candidate has won the election. He has thus,
personally and at very little risk, disenfranchised all persons who voted by absentee
ballot and has thereby possibly himself decided the outcome of the election.
Id. at 272.
267. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
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to a finding of fraud in that election would differ depending on which
party or parties, by reasonable inference, were found blameworthy for
the fraud. Assuming B's supporters were the perpetrators, it would then
be proper to invalidate all the absentee votes and declare A the winner,
as did the appellate court in Matter of Protest. Candidate B should be
held accountable for the actions of his or her supporters where they have
sought to subvert the political processes so important to a healthy
democracy. If, on the other hand, A's supporters were involved in the
fraud (and A was ignorant of this fact), then it might be more appropri-
ate to let the election results stand (essentially, what happened in
McDonald) rather than order a new election, which would give A
another chance to defeat B. In this example, the court holds A accounta-
ble for the same reasons it would hold B accountable in the previous
example. Finally, if both A's and B's supporters were engaged in the
substantial fraudulent conduct, then the best remedy may be to order a
new election altogether, as the Juri court did and as did the trial court in
Matter of Protest. This way, the court does not directly reward or pun-
ish either candidate; instead, it allows the voters to decide the issue.
Applying this proposal to the six hypothetical outcomes illustrated
in Figure 1, the results shown on the right side of Figure 2 are signifi-
cantly different from those shown on the right side in Figure 1. The
crucial distinction is as follows: In no instance is a candidate whose
campaign was responsible for fraudulent activity rewarded directly by
the judicial decision.
FIGuRE 2: POTENTIAL AFFECT OF PROPOSAL ON AN ELECTION
Outcome After Applying Proposal
Election Results by Category Where Substantial Fraud Found in
Campaign of Following Candidate(s)
Hypo Machine Absentee Overall Candidate Candidate Candidates
# Vote Vote Winner A B A&B
New Let Stand; NewElection A Winner Election
New Invalidate; NewElection A Winner Election
Let Stand; New NewB Winner Election Election
4 B A A Invalidate; Let Stand; NewB Winner A Winner Election
New Let Stand; NewElection A Winner Election
Let Stand; New NewB Winner Election Election
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This proposal is not without its drawbacks. As the appellate court
in Matter of Protest pointed out, whenever a court orders a new election,
it allows candidates whose campaign might have been fraudulent
another chance to win. 68 When a court invokes invalidation, it
unavoidably disenfranchises some, perhaps many, honest absentee vot-
ers-a result the trial court in Matter of Protest found inappropriate.269
Yet courts applying this proposal in the future will presumably weigh
these potentially adverse effects when fashioning their specific remedy
and decide that, to maintain the integrity of the election process in the
long run, these effects are a relatively small price to pay. 7 °
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are no winners when a court finds that an election has been
infected by substantial absentee voter fraud. We cannot, of course,
exterminate the termites and screw-worms of democracy, as suggested
by Justice Terrell in his colorful opinion cited at the beginning of this
Comment.27' Perhaps we can do more to hold those seeking public
office accountable for their campaigns. As an important step in this
direction, Florida courts should, consistent with the spirit of the control-
ling state law, seek to fashion a remedy for substantial absentee voter
fraud that fits the particular circumstances of the election being chal-
lenged. One of the more important factors courts could consider when
undertaking a review of a challenged election where there is evidence of
substantial fraud in absentee voting is which party or parties were
responsible for the fraud. The remedy fashioned in response to a finding
of fraud, therefore, might be different depending on the extent of a
party's involvement in the fraud.
When viewed in this light, the appellate court's decision in Matter
of Protest reasonably responded to the circumstances of the case. Xav-
ier Suarez's supporters were largely, but not entirely, responsible for the
absentee voter fraud. Although he may not have been personally
involved, or even aware of the fraudulent conduct, he should have been
held accountable for the conduct of his campaign, at least insofar as
fashioning a remedy in response to fraud is concerned. Thus, because
268. See Matter of Protest, 707 So. 2d 1170, supra note 5, at 1174.
269. See Matter of Protest, Case No. 97-25596 CA 09, supra note 2, at 4.
270. Judge Wilson, the trial judge in Matter of Protest, in ordering a new election within sixty
days, was clearly more concerned with disenfranchising honest absentee voters by judicial fiat and
maintaining the integrity of the election process than he was with who might win a new election,
which, after all, would presumably reflect the will of the people. Interview with Judge Thomas S.
Wilson, December 20, 1998.
271. Whitley v. Rinehart, 140 Fla. 645, 651 (1939).
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Joe Carollo won the machine vote, the appellate court could rationally
invalidate all absentee votes, declaring Carollo the winner.
Given some plausible changes to the circumstances and this Com-
ment's more flexible approach to absentee voter fraud cases, the court
could just as reasonably have applied the new election remedy. If, for
example, Suarez had won the machine vote instead of Carollo, then
invalidation of the absentee votes would not have changed the results of
the election. Faced with this fact as well as the results of the run-off
election, which Suarez won, the court could have either ignored the
fraud (because Suarez's showing apparently reflected the will of the
people irrespective of fraud) or ordered a new election to prevent his
campaign from benefiting from it. Given the reasoning underlying this
Comment, the clear preference would have been to order a new election,
notwithstanding Bolden, to preserve the integrity of the election process.
Also, if both parties were found to have participated substantially in
the fraud by reasonable inference such that the will of the people would
have been impossible to discern, irrespective of which candidate
received the greater number of votes in any particular category, a court
could have reasonably ordered a new election to prevent either party
from directly benefiting from the fraud, again despite Bolden. Thus, the
remedy applied must reasonably reflect the specific circumstances it
addresses, and not simply follow outdated or inflexible precedent.
WILLIAM T. MCCAULEY
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